Sadat's Fate Our Own?

If you haven't read or listened Hugh Hewitt's interview with the author of The Looming Tower, do so now! Then, as Hugh suggests, go get the book itself.

One interesting aside from the interview. At one point, Hugh asks Wright whether Iran's 12th Imam or Al Quaeda pose a greater threat to the United States. Wright replies:

LW: It's an interesting question, Hugh. They're both very dangerous in their own way. And I think that the real threat is that they are collaborating in certain ways. I've written about al Qaeda's master plan, its grand plan. And one of the things that al Qaeda would love to see happen is to have happen, is to have the U.S. and Iran in a real conflict, because it was accomplish things that al Qaeda can't do for itself... And we'd be really wise not to try to follow.

Hugh follows with another question: "Would you ever want that government to have nukes, Lawrence Wright?"

LW: You know, no. I don't want them to. But we were likely to see this happen, though, Hugh. We've already had, of course, an Islamist government in Pakistan that developed a nuclear bomb before Musharraf came into power. So although very dangerous, and their contacts with Hezbollah, I think, make it even more dangerous, it may not be something that we can actually stop. So I think we're going to have to find a way to negotiate our way out of this, because the alternative is not very rewarding, I don't think.

Hugh's a pro at this and knows where the tangent should stop so he concludes: "Well, we'll have to come back to that a different day,... we disagree, but we'll just put it aside."

Just a few minutes later in the interview Wright describes the tragic mistake that Sadat made once he came to power in Egypt:

Sadat made the unfortunate calculation that he could let these guys out [the Muslim brotherhood] of prison, and work out an agreement with them. I could see where he would think that.... he calculated that he was a pious Muslim himself, and that he could deal with the radical fringe that was so popular in the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups. But he completely miscalculated.

This strikes me as formidible evidence against Wright's assessment that we should "negotiate our way out of this". Of course, everyone would prefer to avoid war, but we need to face the brutal reality lest we suffer Sadat's same fate.